John Carroll University

Carroll Collected
Masters Essays

Master's Theses and Essays

2019

THE FAILED POST-WAR EXPERIMENT: HOW CONTEMPORARY
SCHOLARS ADDRESS THE IMPACT OF ALLIED DENAZIFICATION
ON POST-WORLD WAR II GERMANY
Alicia Mayer

Follow this and additional works at: https://collected.jcu.edu/mastersessays
Part of the History Commons

THE FAILED POST-WAR EXPERIMENT:
HOW CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARS ADDRESS THE IMPACT OF ALLIED
DENAZIFICATION
ON POST-WORLD WAR II GERMANY

An Essay Submitted to the
Office of Graduate Studies
College of Arts & Sciences of
John Carroll University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Arts

By
Alicia Mayer
2020

As the tide changed during World War II in the European theater from favoring an Axis
victory to an Allied one, the British, American, and Soviet governments created a plan to purge
Germany of its Nazi ideology. Furthermore, the Allies agreed to reconstruct Germany so a
regime like the Nazis could never come to power again. The Allied Powers met at three major
summits at Teheran (November 28-December 1,1943), Yalta (February 4-11, 1945), and
Potsdam (July 17-August 2, 1945) to discuss the occupation period and reconstruction of all
aspects of German society. The policy of denazification was agreed upon by the Big Three, but
due to their political differences, denazification took different forms in each occupation zone.
Within all four Allied zones, there was a balancing act between denazification and the urgency to
help a war-stricken population in Germany.
This literature review focuses specifically on how scholars conceptualize the policy of
denazification and its legacy on German society. Scholars use common themes emphasized in
denazification scholarship prior to the reunification of Germany and post, which include:
economic, political, and judicial. Contemporary scholarship took the major themes of
denazification and evaluated the success of denazification within the political, economic, and
judicial systems of both the eastern and western zones. Today’s scholars draw further
conclusions from previous scholarship in the West and East, and reflect a cohesion between the
East and the West within their research about German historiography. Furthermore, this review
emphasizes the new research within the field, German memory and how failed Allied
denazification policies had a significant impact on both the East and West German people’s
ability to come to terms with their Nazi past. Therefore, this literature review showcases the
departure from previous scholarship within German historiography, and the innovations made by
contemporary scholars in emphasizing the failures within the political and judicial systems of
1

denazification in both the eastern and western zones by analyzing the German experience and the
specific effects on German society and national identity.
Contemporary scholarship creates a more comprehensible analysis of the period because
of the reunification of Germany. Experts in the field continue to uncover new information about
the occupied eastern zone of Germany; therefore, the narrative about denazification continues to
evolve. Scholars, who published literature prior to reunification, lack certain elements crucial in
understanding the complete historiography of denazification. One major element missing from
the denazification narrative prior to reunification is a lack of representation of the Soviet
occupied zone. Most literature prior to reunification is western-Allied focused with strong
political undertones.
Another key element missing from prior scholarship is historians did not emphasize the
social history affected by denazification policies. The social experience of East and West
Germans was missing from scholarship within the late 1940s-1980s. There are several examples
of historians who created strong historiographies of the period that are valuable, but lack the
eastern perspective, as well as the social experience.
Elmer Plischke, wrote a useful piece in April 1947 about “Denazifying the Reich,” but
his blatant disregard to the Soviet-occupied zone and the German experience makes his piece of
literature the quintessential narrative that reflects prior historiography in the field. Even though
Plischke’s narrative favors a western perspective, he provides empirical evidence and introduces
the shortcomings and complexities of denazification that contemporary scholars still discuss.
Some of the complexities he includes are the political controversies between the Western Allies
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and the Soviet Union,1 and the difficulty the Allied Council had in enforcing denazification and
removing Nazis from civil service occupations.2 The shortcomings Plischke mentions within his
work are still considered the failures of denazification in today’s narrative. Where the historians
diverge is in their explanation of why the failures happened and their effects on the German
populace.
Lastly, Plischke represents a common notion among scholars today that, because
denazification struggled to “satisfactorily rid Germany of pernicious Nazi psychology and
attitudes,” it failed.3 Plischke’s historiography is valuable within the field today, but lacks an
eastern perspective unlike contemporary scholarship. There is a notable shift within scholarship
from Plischke’s western world narrative around the late 1980s and into the early 1990s that
elaborated on common themes of denazification (political, economic, and judicial) to include
East and West German social history and memory.
In 1990 Wolfgang Benz broke from a Plischke-type of narrative and used popular themes
to draw conclusions from their effects on German citizens. Benz’ article focuses on director, Veit
Harlan, who produced the Nazi-sponsored film, “Jud Suss” (1940), and his trial for crimes
against humanity. Benz elaborated on the judicial theme of denazification by extending his
research to rehabilitation of previous Nazi party members. His conclusion was that
denazification struggled to rehabilitate party members and functionaries, and instead created
silence, which ultimately hindered German memory. Benz’ innovative work perpetuated more

Elmer Plischke, “Denazifying the Reich,” The Review of Politics 9, no. 2(1947):160.
Ibid, 158.
3 Ibid, 164.
1
2
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scholars to study German memory and further analyze denazification policies to create new
conclusions.
Today’s scholars’ strength lies in the emphasis they put on social history and memory.
Scholars continue to express the need to explore “the impact that American, British, French, and
Soviet occupiers had on German identity and memory.”4 The first section of the review,
“Understanding the Historiography of Denazification: East vs. West,” emphasizes the
historiography of denazification from both the Soviet occupied zone and the Western-Allied
zones. Section two, “Denazification and the Judicial, Economic, and Political Systems of
Germany’s Occupied Zones,” examines how contemporary literature displays the failures of
judicial, political, and economic systems, which had major implications for German society post
World War II. Lastly, section three, “The Legacies of Denazification,” displays the newest
innovations of scholarship on denazification, which is centered around German memory. The last
section illustrates the major effects and failures of denazification on Germany. The field
continues to evolve in regards to denazification, and memory studies are at the forefront, which
makes the last section highly significant. All three sections reflect the recent scholarship about
denazification and how contemporary scholars “consider the actual results of the experiment of
denazification.”5

Mikkel Dack, “Retreating into Trauma: The Fragebogen, Denazification, and Victimhood in Postwar
Germany” in Traumatic Memories of the Second World War and After, ed. by Peter Leese and Jason
Crouthamel (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), 147.
5 Mary Fulbrook, Interpretations of the Two Germanies (New York, St. Martin’s Press Inc, 2000), 15.
4
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Section One: Understanding the Historiography of Denazification: East vs. West

Part I: The Denazification Debate with the United States and Soviet Union6
Historians begin discussion of denazification prior to the conclusion of the war (1943)
and continue their analyses far beyond the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Democratic Republic of Germany. The complex legacy of denazification came to light by
reunification in 1989 because of the different paths the Allied Powers took during denazification.
Contemporary scholarship is focused in displaying both the perspective of the East and West;
this is a main divergence from prior reunification work. Section one’s purpose is to review the
historiography of denazification within contemporary scholarship.
According to Fulbrook, the term denazification was first used by the Americans in the
Pentagon as early as 1943.7 The Pentagon began the program by focusing the majority of their
efforts on reform of the German legal system. The purpose, according to the Pentagon, of
denazification was to reverse the Gleichschaltung (process of Nazification) that pervaded
German society in 1933/34. Denazification meant purging German society of its Nazi influence.
Even the most active supporters of denazification knew that Nazism could not be completely
undone. In order to combat Nazism within occupied Germany, the Pentagon focused directives
of denazification on not only the legal system, but applied to the “full range of Allied reform and
punishment measures in occupied Germany within the political and economic systems as well.”8
6

Ibid.,11.; Many scholars discuss the difficulty in creating a succinct periodization for historical
investigation. Historian, Mary Fulbrook, explains that periodization is a “convenient framework for the
retrospective imposition of intellectual order and the flow of events and trends.” Depending on the
historical narrative, historians must choose the specific trends, turning points, and key dates that stand
out to explain a period. She urges scholars not to limit themselves to very specific dates because, in order
to draw conclusions about a historical period, one must look at what happened previously in order to fully
understand the period.
7
Perry Biddiscombe, The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1950 (Gloucestershire: Tempus
Publishing Limited, 2007), 9.
8
Ibid.
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Perry Biddiscombe, a leading member in the field on denazification expresses that when
analyzing denazification historiography, it is pertinent to ask the two following questions: “Were
the goals of denazification policy worthwhile and were they practical? And second, was
denazification policy developed in a responsible and balanced fashion?”9 The process of
denazification shared in a variety of literature through the past seventy-five years, has not
changed in regards to asking the above questions posed by Biddiscombe. Scholarly work by
historians such as Biddiscombe, unpack the questions posed with a new perspective. He engages
in the limitations of denazification by analyzing the German citizenry, pre and post war.
Biddiscombe explains that the Allied Powers created policies for denazification without a strong
analysis of the individuals who voted in the NSDAP. He references Jill Jones by stating, “Allied
policymakers never developed planning to the point where they were able to draw distinctions
between moral and political criteria, much less defining specific aims in either sense.”10 There is
a much stronger, unapologetic tone, between Biddiscombe’s narrative of denazification from
Elmer Plischke, an early denazification scholar. Unlike literature published pre-reunification,
Biddiscombe’s historiography does not sound political. He is justified in the ways in which he
criticizes both the United States and the Soviet Union’s policies. There is an unbiased, genuine
truth that is illustrated throughout his research, and this is an important contribution to the field.
Biddiscombe’s literature does not depart from prior historiography, he simply adds to the
historical narrative with the limitations and criticisms at the forefront. His work reflects the state
of the field today.
Biddiscombe begins his narrative on denazification in 1943 when Allied victory in
Europe seemed possible. He reminds us that the Allies were not quite sure what they were going

9

Ibid, 40.
Ibid, 41.
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to do with postwar Germany. There was a major difference of opinion between the Western
Allies and the Soviet Union due to ideological differences.11 Throughout the last year and a half
of the war, the Allied Powers debated their options of how to approach postwar Germany. Some
diplomats advocated mild treatment of the German people, while others wanted to handle the
Germans harshly. There was discussion on breaking apart Germany to create a balance of power
in Europe, while others promoted a centralized, federal state. Not only did the Allies have
different opinions about post-war Germany, but among each country’s respective bureaucrats
there were debates as well. Biddiscombe remarks that the debates within each country are a
crucial point in analysis when analyzing denazification because they had such large impacts on
how the directives were carried out in each zone.
Within the United States, denazification was debated by many. Under the direct oversight
of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
(SHAEF) created a civil affairs section in February 1944 called G-5 with a German Country Unit
(GCU) for occupation planning.12 According to Biddiscombe, “The GCU’s primary function was
to prepare the Handbook for Military Government for Germany.”13 Work on the Handbook
began on March 4, 1944, and the goal was to be the universal policy guide on the occupation of
Germany. The Handbook reflected the theme of one school of thought on the occupation of
Germany; the “welfare of the governed.”14 One of the areas of the Handbook that ultimately
failed is its ability to address the power and influence of the Nazi Party.

11

Mary Fulbrook, A History of Germany 1918-2014 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2015),114.
Biddiscombe, 19.; The “welfare of the governed” was a nineteenth century concept that focused not so
much on political sentiments, but on administering to an enemy population where the occupiers would
help restore utilities, public health, and the labor supply to any affected area. 12The Handbook fixated on
removing undesirable personnel and abolishing the Nazi Party, thus keeping the administrative structure
in Germany primarily intact. Biddiscombe, 19.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
12
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The GCU did not have the foreknowledge or know how to cope with the infiltration of
the Nazi Party into local administration, the civil service, the economy, and legal system. In
response to purging the NSDAP members from all facets of German society, the GCU created
the Fragebogen.15 “Welfare governed” policy was considered by many as a “soft” approach to
occupation, which threatened many others’ opinions in the United States, therefore, sparking
even more debate about denazification and occupation.
One of the first cohorts to devise a denazification plan in Washington was a group made
up of Ivy League academics and dissidents from Germany, known as the Frankfurt School. They
used their analysis of life in Nazi Germany in order to create a plan to purge German society of
Nazism. They concluded that the only way to defeat Nazism was to allow the German people to
exercise a “spirit of criticism.” This meant that the purge of Nazism would come from within the
population rather than administratively by occupying powers.16 The Allied invasion of Germany,
according to the Frankfurt school, hindered the ideal of self-cleansing, therefore it was
abandoned.
Another school of thought was the Neumann School, which had roots in the American
“spoils systems.” With a great deal of research, the Neumann School compiled lists of different
degrees of perpetrators within the NSDAP,17 and evaluated the level of Nazi affiliation in
membership groups or appointments. An interesting outcome of the Neumann School is it
perpetuated one of the major limitations of denazification. The focus on groups rather than
individual actions allowed perpetrators to slip through the postwar legal system.

15

Ibid., 24.; The Fragebogen was given to all German government officials and asked for detailed
information about Nazi affiliation. Any German citizen who wanted to receive their ration cards or work
under Allied occupation had to fill out the 131 questions on the Fragebogen.
16
Ibid., 22.
17
The groups consisted of Wehrmacht members, civil servants, SS officials, and business leaders.

8

Lastly, the collective guilt school of thought came in late summer 1944. Collective guilt
was the notion that all Germans should reap the consequences and responsibility of their Nazi
leaders. As the war continued on, there was a common plan upon occupation of German territory
in which the occupying party provided maintenance of economic and social life before final Nazi
surrender.18 Due to the sentiment in favor of collective guilt shared by many Allied personnel,
both the handbook and CCS 551 were disregarded. In Washington, the Handbook received
negative criticism, and the desire to create a hardline plan of stripping Germany of all their
economic power and dividing the country into several small, agriculturally driven provinces
became the new focus in the Treasury Department.19 The hard occupation was disputed and the
final resolution for occupation came in a compromise within the United States and its leading
bureaucrats. The War and State Departments chose a combination between the “welfare state”
and “collective guilt” policies, realizing that eliminating fascist influence did not go far enough
in Italy, therefore, Nazis needed to be punished more harshly for their involvement.
Biddiscombe’s contribution is his criticism about the debates that took place within the
United States prior to the conclusion of the war are major contributions to the field; for example.
Within Biddiscombe’s historiography, he explains that none of the leading policy makers wanted
to take a risk on a “bomb-battered” country, which is understandable, but the fearfulness within
the bureaucrats was reflected within their various denazification policy. The American
bureaucrats were so consumed with fear and this sense of competition to implement President
Roosevelt’s will in regards to the occupation that their policies ended up useless, and still
unfortunately implemented. He creates a rather unusual, but correct comparison between Hitler
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Ibid., 29.
Ibid., 30. This plan was known as “hard occupation” and was constructed by Henry Morgenthau within
the US Treasury Department.
19
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and Roosevelt. When historians study the political and bureaucratic inner workings of the Nazi
state, they often use the “functionalist interpretation;” 20 Biddiscombe uses this to describe the
bureaucratic debates about denazification in the U.S. Similar to Hitler, Roosevelt used a similar
approach with his leadership, specifically during the first stage of denazification due to his
personalization of executive power21 and distrust in the state department. In comparison to Nazi
bureaucrats, American policy makers from the War, State, and Treasury Departments all
proposed the most radical denazification policies in order to outperform the others.22
Biddiscombe cites this as the beginning to the failure of American denazification. Yet he notes
that the United States was not the only Allied power that struggled to agree on an appropriate
denazification program.
Similar to the United States, there were three schools of thought within the Soviet Union.
The first school was the “hard peace” approach, which would have appeased the leaders in the
United States Treasury Department.23 Created by two committees in the Politburo, the “hard
peace” approach suggested the dismemberment of Germany, but differed on how that should be
accomplished. One committee stated there should be five million workers recruited from
Germany to do hard labor in the Soviet Union. The other, knowing that the Western Allies would
not agree, stated that the USSR’s “best bet was simply to dismantle and extract massive
quantities of industrial booty as quickly as possible, treating the occupation like a glorified
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Ibid, 41.; The functionalist interpretation explains the political and bureaucratic system of the Nazi state
was run by a charismatic and remote leader. The leader provided rough policy guidelines and allowed
subsidiary centers of power implement the policies with what they believed to be the desire of the Fuhrer.
Due to competition, the lower level bureaucrats radicalized while implementing the will of the Fuhrer.
21 During Roosevelt’s presidency, he became a strong figurehead of the federal government. All
presidents are a figurehead, but Roosevelt was different. He created an almost cult of personality around
himself. Due to his immense control and influence, his cabinet members and other departments within the
federal government to create policies in the name of Roosevelt (what would FDR want and how would he
fix the problem).
22 Ibid., 41
23
Ibid., 121.
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pillaging expedition.”24 The second school of thought focused on keeping Germany together, but
Bolshevizing it, hoping that revolutionary currents would spread from the Soviet zone to the
Western zones.25 Re-indoctrinated prisoners of war and German communists in exile would lead
the revolution against the Junker class. The last school of thought fixated on preserving the
“popular front” strategy.26 This strategy would serve as a path to socialism and would have less
interference from the Soviets in German affairs, even though a course would require reeducation, land reform, and decartelization.27 After much deliberation, the Soviets chose a
combination of the “hard peace” approach with Bolshevik undercurrents.28
Biddiscombe explains that both the United States and the Soviet Union failed in creating
adequate policies within their own country because of bureaucratic rivalries.29 Even though the
debate with America had democratic accountability, it did not mean it was any more consistent
and successful than the Soviet Union. Biddiscombe emphasizes the important conclusion made
by scholars today about the two superpowers, which is that their ideologies and bureaucracies
were different, but they both shared the inability to create a successful denazification program.
The debates within both Allied nations had lasting negative effects on denazification.
Part II: The Denazification Debate between the Allied Powers
As the Allies advanced upon Germany in 1944, neither the Soviet Union nor United
States had a fully formulated plan for denazification in their occupied territory, which scholars
unanimously agree is why it ultimately failed. The Allies did reach one conclusion during

24

Ibid.
Ibid., 122.
26
Ibid, 124.; “Popular Front Strategy advocated for the establishment of an anti-fascist German
bourgeoisie order and the completion of the 1848 Revolution.”
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid, 125.
29 Ibid, 153
25
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wartime planning, which was the agreement on zones of occupation. The Post-Hostilities
Planning Subcommittee in September 1943 created a map of three proposed zones of occupation.
At the Teheran Conference in late 1943, it was decided that the general agreement for
denazification was to demilitarize, denazify, and democratize Germany.30 At the Yalta
Conference in February 1945, the Big Three agreed that France should have an occupation zone
too along with the three zones allocated for the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain.
There were multiple disagreements between the Allies about reparations, eastern boundaries of
Germany, and the future of Germany.31 Finally, at the Potsdam Conference from July 17 to
August 2, 1945, the Allies, consumed in debate, had little resolution or compromise on how to
conduct denazification, thus leading to inconsistencies within the occupation zones.
Even though the Allies struggled with compromise, at Potsdam the Protocol of
Proceedings was created. This indicated the goals of Allied denazification: denazify,
demilitarize, and democratize. The Allies agreed to a nine-point plan:
(1) Liquidating the Nazi Party including affiliated and subsidiary organization, (2)
Eradicating of Nazism from German legislation, decrees, and regulations, (3) Changing
the names of parks, streets, and public ways, institutions and buildings and statues named
after persons or things associated with Nazism or German militarism, (4) seizing and
holding of premises, property, funds, and loot of Nazi Party and its affiliated and
subsidiary organizations and of individual Nazis subject to arrest, (5) prohibiting of Nazi
privileges and benefits of Nazi pensions and emoluments, (6) arresting and detaining
Nazi leaders, influential supporters, and other persons dangerous to the Allied occupation
and its objective, (7) removing and excluding from public office and positions of
responsibility and importance in quasi-public and private enterprise of members of the
Nazi Party, (8) preventing Nazi propaganda in any form, and removing Nazism from
German information services and media, and (9) prohibiting German parades, the public
playing or Nazi anthems, and the public display of Nazi flags and other party insignia and
paraphernalia.32

30

Fulbrook, 114.
Ibid., 115.
32 Plischke, 156.
31
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Many scholars, like Fulbrook and Biddiscombe, discuss the Protocol Proceedings as a pivotal
moment in denazification policy historiography. Within the proceedings there was so much left
open for interpretation that the occupiers chose to institute their own understandings. Fulbrook
reflects the conclusions drawn by contemporary scholars by explaining the major differences
between the West and East. The western zones tended to lean more towards rehabilitation than
transformation meaning the West utilized the political and economic systems already in place in
Germany, but elevated them to mirror America’s democracy and capitalism.33 On the contrary, in
the eastern zone of Germany, the Soviets created a radical transformation of the social and
economic organization of Germany.34
Even though the zones approached the aims of occupation differently, they all faced the
same complex obstacles—which ultimately led to the failure of denazification in all zones.
Failure in both the East and the West is a new conclusion made by post-reunification scholarship.
Because so much of the East was shut off to western historians and politicized for propaganda,
scholars were unable to make strong comparisons of denazification’s legacy as a whole.
Fulbrook explains, “They had to administer a war-torn country, attempt to get basic transport and
communications functioning again, feed and house the hundreds of thousands—eventually
millions—of refugees fleeing or expelled from former Eastern homelands, and combat problems
of homelessness, malnutrition and disease among the native population.”35 In addition to
administering to infrastructure and the welfare of Germany, the Allied Powers had to purge their
zones of Nazis and try to reeducate an entire population. Even though the Allies had differing
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Ibid., 126.
Ibid., 125.
35
Ibid., 122.
34
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opinions, they all agreed to the same objective: to ensure Germany would never threaten her
European neighbors or the rest of the world again.36
Debates among scholars about each zones’ denazification efforts persist. Some historians,
like Louisa McClintock, tend to argue that the Soviets focused specifically on their ideological
agenda, so much so that behind every step of their denazification policy there was an underlying
motivation to turn the eastern zone communist. Some of McClintock’s claims are in conflict with
the prevailing way of thinking in the field, specifically with her generalizations made about the
Allied Powers. She claims that denazification policy was “administered uniformly,” yet other
scholars such as Biddiscombe and Jeffrey Herf beg to differ.37 McClintock’s voice resonates
more with scholars prior to the opening up of East Germany.
In contrast, Biddiscombe and Fulbrook explain that Soviet denazification aimed at
purging their zone in Germany of fascism; however, through late 1946 to 1947, the Soviets
transformed their zone along ideological lines.38 They also share that the Soviets were not the
only zone to mirror ideology after their own. The United States also used their occupation
powers to rehabilitate the ideology of West Germans. Fulbrook and Biddiscombe represents a
new balance in the field today by incorporating the political aspirations of both the United States
and the Soviet Union.
Within McClintock’s scholarship, she omits the early process of Soviet denazification, in
addition to the United States’ agenda. She states, “For the Soviets, denazification was a tool for
seizing control of the state apparatus and collectivizing economic life, and they made virtually no

36

Plischke, 153.
Louisa McClintock, “Facing the Awful Truth: Germany Confronts the Past, Again,” Problems of PostCommunism 52, no. 6 (2005): 33.
38
Fulbrook, 125 and Biddiscombe, 152.
37
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attempt to distinguish between active and nominal Nazi Party members.”39 McClintock is not
mistaken with her interpretation, but Biddiscombe and Fulbrook share a more comprehensive
contemporary analysis of the steps the Soviet Union took to create a zone primed to become the
German Democratic Republic, and incorporate the United States’ desire to push their respective
ideology on their occupation zone.
Scholars such as Fulbrook, Biddiscombe, Herf, and McClintock share similar interpretations of
the differences between the Anglo-Allied Powers and the Soviets, and how they conducted
denazification within their zones of occupation in Germany. Contemporary denazification
historiography showcases the distinct differences between the East and West, but also explains
similar limitations and struggles both zones experienced. In prior reunification scholarship, the
historiography not only is missing the eastern zone, but also the relationship between the West
and East. Post-reunification scholarship emphasizes a “double history of Germany.” Fulbrook
states that there are attempts, which resonate within all of the scholars showcased within this
review, to integrate the East German past into the history of Germany.40 Contemporary scholars
are more successful than previous historians in weaving an interconnected historiography
between the western and eastern occupation zones, but according to Fulbrook, still tend to lead
with their western voice. Soviet Zone:
Before examining the historiography of denazification within the two zones illustrated by
contemporary scholars, it is pertinent to understand the East with direct relation to the West.
Fulbrook states that after the fall of communism in 1989, the archives opened, and historians
rushed to uncover the truths. She clarifies that after the first rush occurred, historians chose to
adopt a more thoughtful approach to the analysis of the German Democratic Republic (GDR),

39
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McClintock, 34.
Mary Fulbrook, Interpretations of the Two Germanies (New York, St. Martin’s Press Inc, 2000), 6.
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and reexamine the history of West Germany too.41 She explains that examining the
historiography in East Germany is controversial because of the political differences.
Fulbrook shares that the process of uncovering the “truths” about the GDR have been
daunting. The Federal Republic German Parliament created a commission of inquiry to assist in
“coming to terms” with the history of the GDR.42 Fulbrook reminds us that the historiography of
the East is an ongoing debate due to the way in which GDR history is divided. First, there is the
Socialist Unity Party (SED) published history that promoted party legitimacy. Second, the
unpublished history that consists of works from historians, sociologists, surveys carried out by
organizations, and the Stasi. Lastly, the third category is that of the dissident narratives. All
categories of history have their limitations from which to draw conclusions, but all are
academically significant in their own right. Fulbrook states that is important while doing research
to keep the limitations in mind of GDR history, but with proper analysis and corroborating
empirical evidence, historians are successful in drawing legitimate conclusions about the East.
The historiography on the Soviet zone within this review reflects the conclusions drawn from
empirical evidence and formulated by leading scholars in the field such as Biddiscombe and
Fulbrook.
Biddiscombe explains that it is commonly assumed that the Soviet denazification was far
different from the West. Previous scholarship was written predominantly from a western
perspective. Western historians prior to reunification explain denazification in the eastern zone
as having little independent importance and “merely an initial means to achieve a more nefarious
ends.”43 Biddiscombe begins his analysis of eastern zone denazification with conclusions similar
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to Fulbrook. He states, with “although much remains obscure, evidence from newly opened
archives indicates a pattern of policy formation quite different from that suggested by Western
models of totalitarianism.44 He states that the Soviets probably wish they were as clever as the
West gave them credit for, but in actuality they were as poorly organized, confused, and as
indecisive as their Western Allies. He explains that the Soviets followed a similar path as their
Western Allies’ policies by leaving Nazis in place, not adhering to the ‘top-down’ directives, and
reacting to the local conditions, rather than instituting a universal plan.45 Biddiscombe explicitly
references the importance of modern research within the field through his beginning statements
about eastern zone occupation as less political and more about concreate empirical evidence.
Similar to their Western Allies, the Soviets created an administration to oversee
occupation, which was called the Soviet Military Administration (SMA). SMA began ordering
their denazification directives in November 1945. An important distinction in contemporary
scholarship is that Sovietization of the eastern zone was gradual.46 Previously stated, the Soviets
chose to fuse together the Bolshevik and “hard peace” schools of thought. In the Soviet zones,
Red Army combat commanders served as town commandants where they struggled to listen to
anti-fascist Germans.
Politically, directly after occupation, communists were immediately installed into key
positions of civil service.47 By September 1945 a dramatic socioeconomic revolution took place
in the Soviet occupation zone: estates over one hundred hectares and lands belonging to former
Nazis were confiscated and redistributed.48 Fulbrook clarifies a common misconception that the
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Ibid., 119.
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Ibid., 145.
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Mary Fulbrook, Interpretations of the Two Germanies,14.
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Ibid.
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land reform was not to simply move the East into a communist economic system, but focused
more importantly on toppling the Junker class,49 which the Soviets believed helped perpetuate
the cause of militarism and Nazism in Germany.
Throughout Biddiscombe’s work he repeats the Soviet Union’s gradual plan to turn the
eastern zone into a Soviet communist state. He cites minor and monumental moments such as the
lack of support evoked at the Lander levels for the communist Party (KDP), to the suspension of
reparation deliveries from the American zone, to dollar imperialism, and the collapse of the
Control Council in 1948. The significance of Biddiscombe and Fulbrook’s denazification
narrative reflects a new revelation within post-reunification scholarship. Their research helps set
a less western centered view on Soviet denazification.
As early as November 1945, the distinctions were made between “nominal”50 and
“activist”51 Nazis, and by 1947 there was “something of an amnesty for ‘small Nazis’52 who
were prepared to join in the building of a new society.”53 By 1948 and 1949, restrictions on the
activities and rights of former Nazis were removed, and by 1952 received full GDR citizenship.
Fulbrook explains that Soviet denazification policies in the eastern zone failed to allow East
Germans to “confront the German legacy together” because of the assumption of a “new clean
bill of political health”54 brought on by communism. Denazification in the eastern zone inhibited
the creation of a new national identity in the GDR. The East was unable to come to terms with
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their Nazi past because of the distorted history perpetuated by Soviet denazification directives,
specifically within their reeducation plan.
One of the leading memory historians in the field, Robert Moeller, states that as soon as
the shooting stopped, the communist party, with unwavering support from the Soviets, altered
the narrative from the individual German citizen possessing any type of guilt to laying the blame
in the hands of Hitler and his “clique.”55 Furthermore, reeducation emphasized the narrative of
resistance against fascism and the importance to cleanse the eastern zone of Nazis. In reference
to Moeller’s research, Fulbrook states, “In the East the radical socioeconomic reforms in
agriculture, industry and finance started the process of transformation into a Soviet-style
society.” Between the reeducation of a population and the transformation of many systems
within society, they began reshaping the political attitudes and perceptions of the population in
the East, thus paving way for a society free from their Nazi past.
Soviet-sponsored amnesia is an important conclusion made by many contemporary
scholars in the field because it allowed for additional research on memory and the study of
Germans from the East coming to terms with their Nazi past. Memory studies is one of the most
significant developments within the field because it allows for a deeper understanding of the
effects of occupation on the individual German citizenry, from both the West and East. Fulbrook
is not a leading memory scholar, but her use of Moeller’s “collective amnesia” research within
her work expresses support for the new conclusions made in the field and the significant support
of memory studies by leading denazification scholars.
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Biddiscombe and Fulbrook both express the degrees of difference between denazification
within the eastern zone versus the western. The East focused their efforts on transformation of
the economic and political systems, while the West transformed the political system but
rehabilitated all other aspects of German society.56 Historians separate western zone
denazification within two phases. Phase one includes the issuing of the Fragebogen and phase
two focuses on the transition from retribution to rehabilitation, specifically through political and
economic means.
By early summer 1945 there were four directives concerning denazification, specifically
in the American zone. Similar to their Soviet counterparts, the Americans issued a directive in
July 1945 that created 136 mandatory removal categories.57 In order to categorize Nazis, the
western Allies issued the Fragebogen to all German citizens within their zone. It had 131
questions on all aspects of political orientation and activity during the Third Reich.58 The
Fragebogen classified the individuals into five categories: (I) major offenders; (II) offenders;
(III) lesser offenders; (IV) followers or fellow-travelers (Mitläufer); (V) exonerated.59 A tribunal
staffed by Germans, but overseen by Americans, would determine the classification. After final
classification (there was an appeal process in place), individuals might be imprisoned, fined,
restricted in their activities and employment, or be allowed to move in society freely.
In denazification post-reunification scholarship, the Fragebogen is an important piece of
evidence to formulate conclusions about denazification from. Since the questionnaire was done
on an individual basis, historians use it to analyze individual German experience in the West
during the years 1933-1945. Scholars like McClintock, Biddiscombe, Bill Niven, and Fulbrook
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draw similar conclusions on the limitations within Fragebogen system and how it affected West
German society. A common criticism among historians involves the 131 questions posed within
the Fragebogen itself. McClintock states, “The format was vague and did not accurately
establish effective criteria for determining active collaboration with the Third Reich.”60 The
questionnaire was designed to determine party affiliation, but the Allies did not take into account
the extent of the Nazi Party’s infiltration into German society; the Fragebogen struggled to
differentiate between the different categories of Nazi affiliation.
An interesting conclusion both Biddiscombe and McClintock reach involves the issue of
addressing the easiest cases first. The “nominal” (classes III and IV) Nazis were tried and the
more prominent were cast aside because the investigative process was easier and less
cumbersome.61 In order to process the Fragebogen, the occupiers had to verify the responses
with documented evidence. A “nominal” Nazi’s minor involvement in the party was less time
consuming than an “offender.” Furthermore, there was the chance that people could lie or lessen
their affiliation with the NSDAP.
Due to the cumbersomeness of the Fragebogen in the West, the Spring of 1946 was
transformative. The Spring of ’46 was transitional because all Allied Powers realized that the
German economy needed to be rebuilt rather than ravaged.62 The British and French struggled at
home to feed their own people, and the United States worried about the communist threat. The
dangers of communism were beginning to outweigh the Western Allies’ desires to punish former
Nazis. The US State Department urged Clay to speed up denazification, even though many cases
had yet been dealt with. The “schnell” reforms were put in place to recategorize Nazis into class
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II (“Offender”) or class IV (“Followers”). By May 1, 1948 there were still 28,000 cases of Nazi
“hardliners” (class II) awaiting trial.63 The Land denazification ministries took over the cases and
the Spruchkammern hurriedly reviewed the hardcore Nazis in the “Major Offenders” and
“Offender” category. By May 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany was founded, and
denazification was in the control of the new government of West Germany.
Fulbrook concludes through her historiography of western zone denazification a series of
contemplative questions to the field. She wonders whether 1945, after unconditional surrender,
really marks the ‘zero hour’ which many Germans like to claim.64 She continues to question if
there really was a fresh start for the West because denazification analysis from her own work and
colleagues suggests that there was a high degree of continuity as far as both “personnel and
economic structures, even though the political framework was radically changed in the West.”65
She showcases the limitations within western Allied denazification policies, and also the ongoing
research within the field. Fulbrook urges that more research needs to be done within the western
German population during denazification to understand how far western denazification policy
went to rehabilitate the West.
Conclusion on Overview of Denazification:
Denazification in both the eastern and western zones is an ongoing study among
historians. Scholars continue to develop the historiography of the East and its relationship with
the West during occupation. An example of disputed scholarship is in Stalin’s “hardline”
communism plan in East Germany.66 Because of the political differences of the western world
and the Soviet Union, scholarship often reflected the political differences, therefore, many
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western historians throughout the duration of the Cold War concluded that the Soviets had a
preordained plan to create a communist state within their eastern zone. After the archives were
opened post reunification, contemporary scholarship reflects a different narrative that the future
of the eastern zone was not preordained.67
Fulbrook explains that there are areas in the field that need to continue to be analyzed,
including eastern zone history involving the question of why the Social Democratic Party (SPD)
and the Communist Party (KPD) ultimately merged together to form the Socialist Unity Party
(SED).68 Another area of inquiry is the Eastern Germans’ personal experience and how they felt
with the dramatic changes of occupation and communism to their lives. Lastly, an additional area
of study that needs further consideration is whether or not American perceptions of the Soviet
threat were realistic or exaggerated.69 Fulbrook encourages further research to conceptualize how
the policies helped support the division and creation of two different states and societies.70 The
haphazardness, politically-charged agendas, and inconsistencies of denazification helped
perpetuate not only the longevity of the division of Germany, but also its collective memory as a
reunified Germany.
Section Two: Denazification and the Judicial and Political Systems of Germany’s Occupied
Zones
Part I: Judicial System
The Allies focused a great deal of effort at the beginning of occupation, 1945-1947, to
confront the Nazi past through the legal system; this period is known as the Nuremberg
interregnum.71 Denazification within the judicial systems in the East and West includes the
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Nuremberg Trials Länder tribunals. Scholars like Jeffrey Herf, John Michalczyk, and Susanne
Karstedt examine conclusions made among their colleagues in regards to prosecuting nominal
and major Nazi party members within the Nuremberg Trials and Länder tribunals.
Historian, John Michalczyk’s historiography about the Nuremberg Trials aligns with the
majority of contemporary scholars by emphasizing that Nuremberg marks the one moment where
the Allied Powers came together during denazification. 72 Where he stands out among his
colleagues is his use of film to describe the historiography of the Nuremberg Trials. His
approach draws similar conclusions to that of Herf and Karstedt, but his analysis renders a
different perspective. He describes the Allied power’s contribution to the trial through the
evidence they contribute though the use of film, thus not only showing the combined
commitment by the Allies to prosecute the Nazis for their crimes, but the different contributions
made by each country.73
Michalczyk states that the Nuremberg Trials were a combined effort between all Allied
Powers to set a universal precedent on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against
peace. They all maintained that the German citizenry could not and would not govern themselves
until the crimes of the Nazi era were presented to Germans and to the world, and the only way to
do this was through an International Military Tribunal.74 The Nuremberg Charter was signed by
the Allied Powers on August 8, 1945 to handle the war criminals of the European Axis Powers.
The International Military Tribunal was established within Article 1 of the Charter. Article 6 of
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the charter established the four counts for the indictment, which include: crimes against peace,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and participation in a criminal organization.75 The
Nuremberg Trials were held from November 20, 1945 to October 1, 1946, and the successor
trials from 1946-1949. They established that “Hitler and the Nazi regime had launched World
War II as a war of aggression and racism, had ordered and implemented the mass murder of
European Jewry and millions of others in concentration camps and death camps.”76
Within Biddiscombe’s historiography he focuses primarily on the different Länder in
both East and West. Within the West, Biddiscombe cites a major shift within the Spring of 1946,
which changed the course of denazification within the judicial system. All of the Länder
governments approved the “Law of Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism.” The
new legislation focused on rehabilitation and ended the collective-guilt policy. Rather than rely
on the Fragebogen, Land authorities introduced a Meldebogen. The Meldebogen was a watereddown version of the Fragebogen with seventy-eight questions on personal identity, finances, and
party affiliation. The Western Allies put in place the Spruchkammern (denazification civilian
tribunals) that organized prosecutions on the basis of four categories: major offenders, offenders,
lesser offenders, and followers.77 By the spring and summer of 1946, six appellate tribunals were
created to entertain appeals. The new plan separated the nominal Nazis from the active, so
Germans could regain their place back in society. Even though the West sought reform within
denazification policy, Biddiscombe concludes that it was not enough to save the program from
failure.
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Within Biddiscombe’s research he shares the conclusions of western denazification
within the judicial system. He states, “ The ‘Germanization’ of denazification worked poorly
than the first for a multitude of reasons such as many tribunals received bribes,78 universities
struggled to cleanse their faculty and study Nazi population,79 and it was very difficult to find
untainted judges and lawyers.”80 By the end of denazification, the legal system set up by the
Americans, registered over 13 million Germans and tried 958,000.81 Twenty-five thousand were
rated as a “major offender” or “offender” and 595,000 people were classified as “lesser
offenders” or “followers.” Three hundred and twenty-one thousand case proceedings resulted in
exonerations or were abandoned and over a half of million people were punished, but most were
fined.82 The efforts made within the western zones’ judicial systems failed due to the difficulty to
implement and enforce directives.
Throughout Biddiscombe’s research on the East, he explains there were as many mishaps
within the restructured judicial system similar to the West. Rather than tribunals (West), the
Soviets developed Land-level commissions to deal with NSDAP members in their particular
jurisdictions. The Land-level commissions evaluated the citizens in the eastern zone by utilizing
their own questionnaire similar Fragebogen. The NSDAP members who held private or public
posts had to submit to their local commissions. The commissions reviewed the questionnaire and
decided the fate of each individual.
Biddiscombe’s work on denazification within the judicial system is well received by the
field. He is a leading historian because of his vast research conducted and recorded within his

78

Ibid., 73.
Ibid., 68.
80 Ibid., 65.
81 Ibid., 81.
82 Ibid.
79

26

literature. Anyone can put out an abundance of material about denazification, but what makes his
significant is his ability to treat the East and West as their own entities, but he merges them
together to form one Germany history through the multiple failed policies carried out during
Allied denazification. Biddiscombe is the quintessential historian in regards to how
denazification research is shown in modern times by evaluating the Allied program not from just
a western perspective, but from an eastern as well. His use of multiple Länder trials brings
validity and clarity to his conclusions about the similarities and differences between the East and
West.
Similar to Biddiscombe, Herf affirms that there were major differences between the West
and East in regard to denazification within the judicial system in the East. Herf explains that
authorities focused on social class, rather than individual responsibility. Herf states, “The
aristocracy, officer corps, and middle classes were assumed to be followers of National
Socialism, while the working class was assumed antifascist.”83 Due to the Soviets emphasis on
class, Herf encourages that there needs to be more research regarding political justice within the
Soviet zone.
An example of Herf’s literature where he expresses the political injustice within the
Soviet system is through the “The Waldheim Trials.”84 East Germans were labeled “Nazi
criminals,” but in actuality they displeased the East German authorities, which is exactly why
Herf encourages more research to uncover other instances of injustice within the legal system in
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the East.85 Herf’s research created a standard practice for other historians to investigate the East
and the injustices through the lesser Nazi trials.
The conclusion of occupation in both the East and West did not conclude the analysis of
denazification on the judicial systems within the zones. Karstedt and Herf specialize in the
legacy of Nuremberg and the lesser Länder trials, and the considerable effects they had on
Germans within the East and West. Their research is valuable to look at the legacy of Nazi trials
on East and West German society. Both individuals present new research in the field in regards
to the legacy of Nuremberg with respect to German social history. Herf focuses his research on
memory (East and West), while Karstedt centers her analysis on ex-prisoner reentry and its
implications specifically on West German society.
After the conclusion of occupation, many perpetrators were released from prison before
the end of the 1950s.86 Due to the inefficiencies of denazification in post-war German society,
the judiciary system, specifically in Western Germany, struggled with transitional justice and
rehabilitation of war criminals. Furthermore, Karstedt concludes that previous scholarship did
not consider the effects on western Germans of former Nazis reentering society. She encourages
scholars to continue analyzing reentry patterns post-international conflict because the effects on a
society are long-lasting, which is conveyed in her research.
Particularly interesting is Karstedt’s research on how the Nuremberg Trials created a
blueprint for the international community on trying high level perpetrators, but did not set a
precedent for the reintegration of perpetrators into their still troubled societies. The Allies did not
create a procedure for executing prison sentences or early release within the restructuring of the
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judicial system during denazification.87 She analyzes the returning war criminals in regards to
their reentry, admission of guilt and justification, memoirs, and political activism. The
effectiveness and legacy of the Nuremberg and the lesser trials on the two Germanies is
Karstedt’s significant achievement to the field. She concludes that the Nuremberg and the lesser
trials did not help to rehabilitate the perpetrators, which prompted a new area of research in
analyzing perpetrators reentry into eastern and western German societies, and the social effects
from the lack of reentry policy from Allied denazification.
Each international tribunal, according to Karstedt is different, and she encourages
scholars to understand the differences between the way the international community held
Germany responsible post-Nuremberg and how countries today are held accountable for their
actions. The difference lies in the relationship between the western Allies and the new
government of the FRG. The FRG did not gain sovereignty unless the government legitimized
the verdicts of the Nuremberg Trials.88 Even though the Nuremberg Trials’ verdicts had
guaranteed legitimacy from the new government in the FRG, the Allies created no procedure or
road blocks within their denazification policies for the reentry of Nazi perpetrators, therefore the
new government in the FRG chose the procedure (or lack of) for the reentry of prior Nazis.
In addition to Karstedt’s conclusions made about reentry policy, she made a compelling
argument about the lack of individual guilt the Nuremberg Trials fostered for the prior
perpetrators.89 Karstedt claims that the denazification period failed to designate individual guilt,
and shifted the ultimate guilt on Hitler. She concentrates her case study on Albert Speer and
explains that he was the only high-ranking Nazi official to take moral responsibility, but pivoted
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from personal guilt to complete blame and responsibility with Hitler.90 Albert Speer’s total blame
on Hitler perpetuated a type of transferring of guilt from the individual to Hitler.
Another important aspect of a war criminal’s impact on the public, according to Karstedt,
was the perpetrator sharing his or her story to the public through writing a memoir. Karstedt used
Albert Speer’s two memoirs to explain the power behind an ex-prisoner’s memoir on a society’s
memory. She states that when the masses in West Germany read Speer’s memoir it helped to
normalize the climate of a “community of accomplices” within West Germany.91 Therefore,
Speer fulfilled the wish of postwar Germans by being deeply involved in Nazi criminal activity
but coming out untainted by his crimes. The rest of West Germany believed if Speer could be
absolved, so could they.92 The justice system reformed by the western Allies during
denazification did not rehabilitate prior perpetrators after Nuremberg, but helped perpetuate a
society that was unable and unwilling to look at their own personal guilt.
Karstedt’s article is extremely important insofar as it highlights the major conclusion
from scholars about denazification: its ultimate failures within the legal system. Through
analyzing the Nuremberg Trials and how war criminals came back into German society,
Karstedt’s analysis brings to the forefront the discrepancies and missteps that followed
Nuremberg. Her research also touches on the broader theme of German memory and how war
criminals like Albert Speer affected the collective memory of German society. A weakness in her
article lies with her sample size. She focuses so much of the article on Speer, that she forgets to
draw conclusions from the 78 cases that formed the basis for her preliminary conclusions. Albert
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Speer was a prominent perpetrator, but her argument would have been more compelling if she
would have included more references to the other case studies.
Similar to Karstedt, Herf centers portions of his research on the legal measures taken
during denazification, and the effects on German society. His major analysis is in the field of
collective memory, and how the judgements from Nuremberg impacted the East and West
German memory. Within section three, there is a much more in-depth conversation on how
German collective memory was formed due to the mishaps of denazification policy by the
western and eastern zones, but there is an important emphasis on the German judicial system and
denazification. According to Herf, the trials created a very public expression of political history
within each individual’s memory. There was a connection between the Nuremberg judgements
and their focus on Nazi aggression and crimes with postwar German misery.
Before and after the end of the war, the Eastern Germans specifically felt the wrath of the
Nazi race war from the Soviet Union. The Allies showed little attention towards the suffering of
the Germans, and the outcome of the Nuremberg Trials repeatedly focused attention back to the
period of history from 1933-1945. Herf concluded that both the Soviet and Western Allies
struggled to use the judicial system during denazification to help the German people come to
terms with their Nazi past. The policies put in place hindered their soul-searching and had longlasting impact on their collective guilt and memory, which is the major emphasis of Herf’s
research.
Herf elaborates on how collective guilt did not resonate with either the Eastern or
Western Germans, primarily because the trials perpetuated the idea that the only people who
were truly guilty of the Nazi atrocities were the high-ranking Nazis, and not the everyday
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German citizenry.93 Ostensibly because the Nuremberg Trials (along with other Länder
tribunals) prosecuted the fascist leaders, the eastern zone was declared cleansed of fascism. Even
though the Soviets did not come to this conclusion directly after the Nuremberg Trials, it was
their way to never look back on the eastern zone’s Nazi past, thus preventing collective memory
and collective guilt within the Eastern population.94
In summation, scholarship concludes that the judicial system put in place to deal with the
crimes of the members of the NSDAP was ultimately insufficient. Biddiscombe summarizes the
state of the field by stating, “The tribunals soon came to be likened to laundries: one entered
wearing a brown shirt and left with a clean starched white shirt instead.”95 The judicial system
failed to effect a general purge and provoke serious soul-searching. Both Herf and Karstedt
express that the failure of the legal system from both the East and West during denazification had
lasting effects on German society’s collective memory. This conclusion by scholarship does not
disprove the successes of creating an International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, but due to
the lack of policies in place for reentry, amnesties, and inefficiencies of Lander tribunals, and the
need to survive after a world war, the judicial system during denazification cannot be categorized
as an overall success and had major ramifications on German society.

Part II: Politics and Denazification
During the denazification period, German political life was reorganized or transformed,
depending on occupation zone. The political differences between the Soviet Union and the
United States were showcased during the implementation of their respective denazification
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policies. Many of the inconsistencies within Allied occupation were due to a difference in
political beliefs. These differences created a major wedge between the two superpowers, which
perpetuated the beginning of the Cold War. Many scholars post reunification dedicate their
research on understanding the effects Allied political policies had on the German people. This
section displays how contemporary scholars communicate denazification of the political systems
within the East and West, but also shares the new analyses on the legacy of political
denazification.
As the war came to a close in late Spring 1945, the occupying powers decided how to
reorganize German domestic politics. Fulbrook emphasizes while the Allied Powers were eager
to restructure political life in Germany, the Germans themselves were primarily focused on their
day-to-day survival, which created roadblocks for the implementation of Allied policy.96
Fulbrook clarifies the difficulty the Allies had to transform political life because the Germans
first priority was survival, not formulating a new democracy. There were many more worries that
Fulbrook illustrates within German society such as rebuilding homes and communities, finding
missing loved ones, food, and a job. Fulbrook explains that the Allied Powers faced obstacles
prior to the actual implementation of new political policies due to the devastating state of
existence of Germany.
All Allied Powers chose to use democratic rhetoric within their zone. The Soviet zone
emphasized “democratic centralism,” while the Western zones emphasized “freedom and
democracy.”97 Due to the Allies’ different understandings of democracy, they took a variety of
approaches to recasting Germany’s political system in their respective zones.
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Within the East, Fulbrook states by the fall of 1945, it became clear that the Sovietbacked KPD (German Communist Party) would never garner enough electoral support from the
masses due to the popularity of the SPD. Between 1945-46 the Soviets created a merger between
the KPD and SPD (German Social Democratic Party) to create the Socialist Unity Party of
Germany (SED). Over the next years of occupation and denazification, due to pressures and
purges, the communists were able to gain complete control of the SED. Under Soviet occupation,
the SED focused on executing the “democratization” of East German politics under the MarxistLeninist interpretation of democracy.98 Fulbrook explains that even though the rhetoric,
“democratization” was used in both the East and the West, the Western Allies were focused was
focused more on rehabilitation of political life rather than a complete transformation.99
The Western powers’ political views were more muted, according to Fulbrook than their
Soviet counterparts. The West believed in a more grassroots approach, meaning the parties
would be founded at the local levels first. Individuals who wanted to apply for new political
parties could do so in autumn 1945.100 The Western Allies controlled the licensing because they
wanted to make sure of the new political parties’ democratic character. In the West, the SPD and
KPD stayed separate unlike in the East where they combined. The Catholics and Protestants
reformed as the CDU, and several liberal parties emerged, which merged into the Free
Democratic Party (FDP). The CDU dominated West Germany for the next decade and a half
with Konrad Adenauer as its leader. There were many small political parties that never made it
out of the local level, and historians often note that even into the 1950s the vast number of
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political parties looked similar to the Weimar Republic. The Western Allies used their power to
make sure the political chaos of Weimar did not plague the Western occupation zones.
The British and Americans were determined to establish a working democracy at the
local level. Mary Fulbrook explains that the Allies faced difficulties for their desire for a working
democracy to come to fruition at the local levels, much to their own faults. Fulbrook sites
Barbara Marshall’s case study of Hanover. She explains that the British gave unfair advantages
to conservative groups over Social Democrats and deprived the SPD of main organizational
means such as forbidding youth and sporting groups.101 Due to the British control over the
organization of SPD groups, it inhibited their ability to create a functioning community. With the
lack of community present within the SPD, they were unable to efficiently organize, which was
exactly the result desired by the British. Even though the West constantly were differentiating
their democracy from the East, both superpowers were guilty of using their power as a strong
hand in party politics.
Another example Fulbrook cites as a political obstacle within the western zones’
denazification was their struggle to stay politically neutral during local elections. In one town a
Nazi mayor was reelected democratically, and the Americans did not want him in power. They
were conflicted because they wanted to remove the newly elected official, but knew they had to
reinforce the message of democracy. The Allies realized quickly that the Germans could not
quite conceptualize what democracy really meant. Fulbrook explains that democracy to post-war
Germans had negative connotations because the individuals who remembered Weimar
democracy associated it with national debt, humiliation, economic crisis, and political chaos. She
creates a blanket assertion about post World War Germans and states that some Germans still
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associated democracy with humiliation, national defeat, and economic devastation, and on top of
all of that it was being instituted by the victors.102 She needs to elaborate on her generalization
because she negates the population of West Germans that embraced democracy. Fulbrook does
improve her argument by stating that even with the negative sentiments held by the German
people, by spring 1946 local governments were formed in the Western zones. The individuals
elected worked with the occupying powers to rebuild Germany.
Fulbrook’s conclusions about western Allied manipulation is enlightening because it
reflects the reexamination of the western zones by post-reunification scholarship. The new tone
of denazification narratives is indicative in Fulbrook’s literature because she does not only
emphasize Soviet problems, but western as well. Prior to reunification, scholars were creating
separate German history, and Fulbrook demonstrates one of the distinguishing factors of new
literature by combining the historiographies of the West and the East to create a more succinct
representation of political denazification within German history.
Within Robert Moeller’s research he concludes that the legacy of denazification within
the political systems in the Soviet and western zones had a deep impact on the East and West
German populaces. Even though the Soviets focused their efforts on communism and the
western, democracy, the occupiers inadvertently perpetuated a victim narrative for the German
people. Moeller determines the political reorganization of Germany had lasting effects on
Germans viewing themselves as victims, rather than feeling any type of guilt post World War
Two. The victim status perpetuated by the Allied Powers hindered Germans’ capability to
comprehend their Nazi past.
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Within East Germany, the Soviets and East German communists shaped a strong
narrative that the Germans “had been deprived of their rights, deceived and victimized by the
“Hitler clique” that had waged an aggressive war against its European neighbors. The “Hitler
clique” was responsible for the deaths of “millions of Germans” who “had been driven into death
on the battlegrounds and on the home front’ as well as the millions who had died in
concentration camps.”103 In order to change the political climate of East Germany, the Soviets
focused their efforts on anti-fascist education. The noblest forms of German history taught in the
East were the political dissidents who resisted Hitler and his regime. The conversion from Nazi
to communist was extremely important to the political reorganization of East Germany. Given
that the eastern Nazis were declared communists and supposedly converted by the government,
they were forgiven of all their past sins by the communist regime. Moeller explains that the
conversion was simply a myth brought about by the communist regime in East Germany. The
declaration made by the leaders of the GDR assisted in the East Germans inability to deal with
their Nazi past.
Moeller, along with other scholars, demonstrates how a simple policy from the Soviets
changed the psychology of how East German society dealt with their Nazi past. Eastern
politicians reiterated through speeches and public ceremonies the emphasis of antifascist
resistance, continued to elevate individuals like Ernst Thälmann, and downplayed the everyday
German’s suffering from the war.104 Due to the opening of archives post-reunification, Moeller
explains that historians have found interviews with East Germans that revealed their suffering
and grief, and there were no positive sentiments about the Red Army as liberator. These records
prove the magnitude of perpetuated myths upon the East Germans from the political elites. Their
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message and infiltration into everyday German life began during occupation and did not end
until 1989. The lasting political message from the East had lasting effects on East German
memory. Even though the East and West had different political ideologies, similar effects on
memory and victimhood occurred in the West due to denazification policy.
The West, similar to the East, assisted in progressing German people’s victim status. The
difference lied within the rhetoric and messages from political leaders to the German people.
Moeller explains that in 1949 Adenauer (first chancellor of the FRG) addressed the West
German Parliament and explained that the “highest objective” of the new state was “to strive for
social justice and the alleviation of misery.”105 Adenauer used the failures of Western
denazification to emphasize German victimhood since the Allies did not do enough during
occupation to relieve the misery of the German people. He acknowledged that the legacy of the
war took many forms within German society, whether it was loss of life on the battlefield, loss of
life within the Jewish community, individuals who were victimized by the Red Army or by the
Allied bombs, or families who still missed relatives held in eastern POW camps. The political
message to the German people was that the new government would help alleviate their suffering,
thus outwardly labeling Germans victims of the war, rather than perpetrators. Adenauer’s
message of victimhood came from the message of denazification, which claimed World War II
as “Hitler’s War.”106 By the 1950s, the Western Allies agreed with the newly formed FRG
government that the military was not to blame, but Hitler. Adenauer simply expressed the
sentiments fostered during Western Allied occupation. During the early days of the Federal
Republic, rhetoric of victimization was a central part of civic culture.
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Within both the East and the West, the political systems enforced the rhetoric that there
was a small group of Nazi leaders who were responsible for Germany’s misfortunes and the
mass of ‘good Germans’ were ready to move on and learn from their Nazi past.107 Within all
zones, victimhood was established and an emphasis on survival shaped the future of the two
Germanies—whether that be a social market economy or communism.
Moeller’s work reflects contemporary scholarship because he expresses that both the East
and West by 1950 may have been clearing away the rubble and slowly recovering from the
miseries of war, but they were choosing to forget. The strengths of his scholarship lie in his
comprehensive explanation of memory between the two Germanies, but also the way in which he
compares and contrasts them. His particular focus on the East and his attempt to look at
individual narratives within the Soviet bloc country is innovative. Scholars, contemporary and
past, struggle to breach the surface of eastern German life. Moeller found personal narratives that
countered the official history of the GDR. His scholarship on memory has created an evolution in
denazification scholarship that has influenced subsequent studies and his conclusions are
incorporated in an abundance of denazification literature.
Section Three: The Legacies of Denazification and German Memory
A significant conclusion drawn by contemporary historians in the field is that Allied
denazification failed to purge the zones and did not provoke any type of soul-searching in the
minds and hearts of West and East Germans alike. Thus, many Germans never came to terms
with their Nazi past. Because individual life was so difficult in Germany post World War Two,
Germans focused more on their victim status rather than the regime they voted into power. Due
to the failures of denazification in the Allied zones, they helped feed the “collective amnesia” of
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German society after the war. The field’s newest conclusions about German memory are
highlighted through the analysis of the Fragebogen and the legacy of the Allied denazification
on German memory and national identity.
Part I: Fragebogen
Mikkel Dack explains that it has only been within the last twenty years that there is an
active dialogue among historians on how to appropriately remember German suffering.
Discussing German suffering is a difficult subject because many German citizens were
bystanders, or active members of the NSDAP and helped perpetuate a great deal of suffering.
Bill Niven explains that the end of the Cold War has allowed for the introduction of memory
studies without a “distorted and manipulative representation of themes.”108 Not only have
memory studies been an actively new development in the field of history, but also psychology,
sociology, literary studies, and social anthropology. Dack summarizes the state of the field:
“Over the past 70 years, the historiography of post-WWII Germany has evolved from a singleframed story of western liberal triumph, focused entirely on themes of political reconstruction
and large-scale social and economic change, to a series of intricate studies that deconstruct
individual and collective experiences of recovery and remembrance, loss and neglect.”109
Scholars tend to vary in degrees of agreement on German cultural representations of
suffering, but where they reach consensus is on Germans’ sense of victimhood during
denazification. Even though there were benefits from claiming victim status as a German citizen,
the truth is that many did, in fact, experience extreme violence and trauma during and
immediately after the war. Dack shares that by May 1945, “approximately 5.3 million German
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soldiers had been killed, another 4.4 million had incurred injury, and a million had died in
prisoner-of-war camps.”110 Through Allied bombing, some 600,000 civilians died, 900,000 were
wounded, and 7.5 million became homeless.111 Once the war ended, the Allied occupation
authorities had to not only purge Germany of its Nazi past, but also help German citizens deal
with post-traumatic stress and extreme anxiety. Dack explains that scholarly study on German
wartime suffering, victim identity, and the process of Vergangenheitbewaltigung (coming to
terms with the past) has been ongoing in the last twenty years; nonetheless, little is still known
about the private thoughts and psychological state of German civilians during occupation
because of the “political and social chaos and uncertainty of the immediate postwar years.”112
The difficulty to find valuable information about private thoughts from East and West
Germans is inhibited by the strict control over information by the American, British, French, and
Soviet governments. Therefore, historians like Dack rely on occupation reports, opinion polls,
journal entries, newspaper article, and memoirs to conceptualize German thoughts. The major
piece of evidence utilized by scholars is the Fragebogen because it does allow for detailed
evidence of individual German experience. The questionnaire used by the Allies during
denazification not only gives insight for historians, but also allows Germans to talk about their
own suffering, loss, and motivations. The Fragebogen serves two main purposes for scholars: (1)
to learn about individual experience and (2) to study how denazification helped perpetuate
German victimhood.
The Fragebogen was an essential component of Allied denazification (East and West)
and it represents the contradictory nature of the Allied denazification program. Dack states, “The
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Fragebogen was used not only to root out Nazism from German political and economic systems
and to punish ‘active’ Nazis, but also to identify and reward those Germans who had remained
either passive or resistant to the regime and could help in the reconstruction of democratic
principles and institutions.”113 In filling out the questionnaire, German citizens were forced to
relive and reflect on not only the traumas of the war, but also life under the NSDAP. Germans
were able to personally “interpret, describe, and reinvent the traumas of the war and hardships of
a dictatorship.114 Dack explains that leading cognitive psychologists, sociologists, and
psycholinguists maintain that writing helps “assist in the construction of personal narratives” and
helps establish and reinforce an individual’s identity.115 Therefore, the Fragebogen, fostered a
medium for the articulation of victim status perceptions and created an environment in Germany
that delayed psychological recovery from the war.116 Questionnaires from both the East and West
allowed for new stories/identities to be constructed that replaced actual events and factual
information. Thus, allowing individuals to reconsider or rationalize their relationship with the
Nazi party.
Dack’s research on the importance of the Fragebogen is enticing. He explains that
existing literature in memory focuses on the “political and cultural continuities and the
persistence of Germans in forgetting, manipulating, and substituting memories of the past.”117
Dack promotes scholars to dedicate further research on the influences that American, British,
French, and Soviet occupiers had on German identity.118 He encourages to look at the extent to
which the occupiers changed German national identity through their policies of denazification.
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The Fragebogen discouraged Germans from processing their trauma individually. He cites Judith
Herman’s assertion that a survivor of traumatic experiences needs an environment that fosters
empowerment, autonomy, and safety, and denazification did not provide this for the German
people.119 The continued uncertainty, strict military control, discrimination, and denunciations at
the hands of the occupiers (different in each zone and region), 120 caused ordinary Germans to
struggle finding an environment that fostered community and that could cultivate a culture of
coming to terms with the past. Rather, the environment that was created from denazification was
a culture of conflict and mistrust; therefore, national identity was altered, and victimhood was
encouraged.121 Overall, scholars agree that the Fragebogen hindered individual Germans from
processing and overcoming past experiences of war and violence, which prompted retreat to
trauma and victimhood.
Part II: The Legacy of Denazification on German National Identity
Denazification policies created victim status within the German population and also had
lasting effects on West German national identity. The German people found themselves
humiliated and defeated again on a world stage, and they had to bear the devastation from loss of
life, homes, and communities. When the Allied powers occupied Germany they vowed to
demilitarize, denazify, and democratize. All of the negative effects of German defeat previously
stated, created quite the burden on their national identity. The post-war years in East and West
Germany were a crucial time in the creation of a new, national, German identity.
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According to Stephen Welch and Ruth Wittlinger between the late 1950s and 1960s in
both the East and West, marks a new phase of history. In 1965 Adenauer told West Germans that
the postwar years were over and Walter Ulbricht did the same in 1963 for the East Germans.
Both leaders discussed the same sentiments about the future, they encouraged their citizens to
focus on a Germany that was less outlined by their Nazi past.122 Welch and Wittlinger use
Moeller’s research on the ramifications of denazification policy on “German amnesia” and argue
that it directly affected East and West Germany’s recreation of a national identity within the
1950s and 60s. Their work traces the evolution of national identity through post reunification.
Welch and Wittlinger elaborate on the effects directives from denazification policy had
on West Germanys national identity. Because of the atrocities committed during the Third Reich
in Germany, and their desire to forget, the West was reluctant to use national symbols to identify
itself.123 West Germans focused on having more of a European identity following the war, and
identified themselves with “liberal democratic values” due to their lack of pride in their historical
legacy.124 Because of their troubling past, West Germans became the model cosmopolitan state
since they focused their efforts on integration and supported the European project.
While attempting to navigate their new national identity, Moeller, Fulbrook, and JeanPaul Bier and Michael Allinder argue through a series of events between the 1960s to
reunification, mark major moments of evolution within the West German’s pursuit for a national
identity. The scholars listed above create a stronger evaluation of West German national identity
than Wittlinger and Welch because of their use of a variety of historical events, but also their
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ability to make connections between historical events within the decades prior to reunification;
something that Wittlinger and Welch’s research is lacking.
Fulbrook characterizes the 1960s within West Germany as a resurgence of Germany’s
Nazi past. Younger generations questioned the older generations about their Nazi past. Due to a
more activist spirit within the youth population, scholarship started to address the ordinary
system and Nazi past. One of the first historical moments Fulbrook cites as important to opening
of West Germany’s Nazi was the Adolf Eichmann Trial125 in 1961. Not only did the trial
resurface Germany’s Nazi past, but sparked a resurgence in convicting perpetrators. In 1969 the
statute of limitations was lifted, therefore, allowing perpetrators to still be convicted of their
crimes.126 In the early 1960s, the West Germans also found that the accusations made by their
communist neighbors about the Chancellor’s cabinet were true. Adenauer’s cabinet had a
number of high-ranking Nazi officials, therefore, connecting West Germany directly to Hitler, a
fact that was constantly reiterated by the East. By the late 1960s, Willy Brandt, a Social
Democrat, was elected chancellor and changed the direction of German memory and identity.
The later part of the century prompted even more drastic measure taken in regards to
West Germans confronting their Nazi past. Moller mentions May 1970 as an important time in
West German’s evolution of national identity because it was the first time in history that the
German Parliament commemorated the end of the war, and Brandt called for a “sober
confrontation with the past.”127 The 1980s brought intensified scrutiny of the past, therefore
allowing the conversation about all of the victims of the Third Reich such as homosexuals,
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Jehovah’s witnesses, Sinti and Roma, and “asocials.” The new conversations brought about by
the 1980s were a departure from the idea of victimhood of German citizens that was perpetuated
by Allied denazification. Moeller states, “The story of the German past that emerged in the
Federal Republic in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s was one in which ‘no one was free from
history’, and if not collectively guilty, Germans were certainly collectively accountable for their
past.”128 Even though Germans began to come to terms with their past, the constant reminder of
their Nazi past made it difficult, according to Welch and Wittlinger, for Germans to create a
national identity they were proud of.
The 1990s and early 2000s, sparked a new balance between victimization and
acknowledgment and guilt, and Germans’ ability to feel pride within their national history.
Welch and Wittlinger explain that the German Chancellor (1998-2005), Gerhard Schroder,
contributed to the normalization of Germany and its postwar period. Schroder helped perpetuate
the notion that the Nazi past did not need to function as an obstacle within German history and
identity. Prior to Schroder, it seemed that any positive sentiments towards German national
identity were hindered because of the Holocaust. However, he encouraged citizens to fully
acknowledge the crimes committed under the Third Reich, so a positive national identity could
be created in Germany.129 Schroder created a new power and confidence for Germans to engage
with their Nazi past, rather than hide and forget it. Welch and Wittlinger mark Schroder’s
sentiments as significant in the development of German national identity because he reminded
them that Germany is much more than the years of 1933-1945.
Fulbrook, Moeller, Welch and Wittlinger use previous scholarship to connect the field of
memory to the evolution of German national identity post World War II. They emphasize the
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importance of the occupation years (fostering victimhood) had on the development of a national
identity in the West by tracing German identity into the recreation of the German Republic and
how Germany achieved a positive outlook on their national identity. Welch and Wittlinger
highlight within their research that Germany’s ability to come to terms with its Nazi past within
the last thirty years helped perpetuate an all-inclusive German national identity. The twenty-first
century in Germany, concluded from Welch and Wittlinger, marks a German national identity
that encompasses the atrocities from the past, the separation of a nation, and the reunification all
with an underlying tone of pride in the major accomplishments of German history.
Unfortunately, the weakness of their research lies in its disregard for the East and missing
moments in history of the West. After a brief overview of the FRG’s national identity or lack
thereof, the analysis goes straight into post reunification with the election of Gerhard Schroder as
the chancellor. Wittlinger and Welch disregard East German identity and the implications of
combining two separate identities into one reunified country after the wall fell. The article by
Wittlinger and Welch, even with its faults, explains the long-standing impact of Allied
denazification policies on Germany’s national identity.
Conclusion:
The study of denazification has been ongoing since the conclusion of Allied occupation.
The state of the field has not changed dramatically with the historiography of western
denazification. The difference between the past, prior to reunification and today, is historians did
not have the resources from the East to create a comprehensive, Allied denazification
historiography. The historiography of the western-Allied perspective tended to have political
biases and historians used speculation to fill in the missing information about the East. After the
conclusion of the Cold War, scholars accessed the historical archives that helped create a
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complete Allied denazification historiography. Scholars continue to research emerging evidence
from the East in order to contribute more of a complete German history of denazification.
Furthermore, scholars, within the late twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first
century, started dissecting the prior historiography even more after reunification to draw more
conclusions on German social history, which has transformed the field of study in regards to its
themes. The political, economic, and judicial themes of denazification still remain prominent
fields of study within denazification, but have been extended and elaborated on to explain the
effects the political, judicial, and economic policies of denazification had on East and West
Germans.
Throughout the 1990s into the twenty-first century, the new theme of memory emerged
within denazification studies. Historians started working with sociologists, psychologists, and
social anthropologist in order to continue to study uncharted territory of the relationship between
history and memory. Historians have revolutionized how denazification is studied and taught.
Moeller, Fulbrook, Herf, Wittlinger and Welch, and Dack changed the way in which
denazification is researched. They emphasize the importance of the German experience due to
denazification policy. It is no longer a one-dimensional entity of occupation, but a complex
process with many effects that are shared throughout the essay.
After analyzing a variety of pieces of literature on the topic of denazification, the field
still needs to continue its research on East Germany and denazification’s effects on Germans
coping with their Nazi past. The field is flooded with information about the West, and there is a
need for Moeller, Biddiscombe, and Fulbrook specifically to continue their work in
understanding the East Germans and their individual relationships with their Nazi past. This
literature review’s purpose is to showcase the continuity and progress within scholarship about
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denazification, with an emphasis on the failures and effects of Allied political and judicial
denazification policies.
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